This paper presents the design of a new substation automation system architecture based on industrial automation technology, the development of an IEC 61850 compliant distance protection scheme and its test results. The proposed centralized structure means benefits for system integration since a higher degree of standardization can be achieved. Furthermore the approach guarantees manufacturerindependent and flexible IEC 61131-3 programming. Thus any implemented protection and control functions are portable and which saves otherwise required redevelopment effort in case of a required migration process.
Introduction
Due to the increase of decentralized energy supply from renewable energy sources, distribution level experiences new operational challenges. Especially fluctuating power flows and varying short circuit power make a reliable grid protection difficult and strengthen the demand for more sophisticated protection schemes. Even though the current degree of automation, installed measurement and telecontrol technology in distribution level is low and limits operational options. To maintain the security of supply without taking measures of grid capacity extension and for better utilization of the existing network capacity, intelligent concepts and technologies for monitoring and control are required. Yet, conventional ICT-architectures in substations have a decentralized structure with a dispersed allocation of protection and control functions on special purpose devices. Their characteristics don't allow for a comfortable extension of functionality since they are manufacturer-dependent and offer a low level of standardization. Conclusively, future protection and control systems in substations must be more adaptive to dynamic operational conditions, more flexible for system integration and less expensive. At the IET Conference in 2011 a new approach was introduced that proposes a new generation of intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) based on programmable logic controller (PLC) hardware from industrial automation technology [1] . Thereby a prototype has been validated in comparison to the state of technology and proves that automation systems can also be used for power system protection. Further analysis of the proposal provided excellent results and has proven that the necessary performance for protection applications in power systems can be achieved [2] . In the same year a novel substation automation system (SAS) based on PLC-technology has been proposed [3] and its concept has been patented [4] . It presents the drawbacks of conventional ICT-architectures for system integration and emphasizes the benefits of a centralized structure using standard hardware. However, the concept of the novel SAS in [3] lacks a prototype and the implementation of a protection scheme using data models due to IEC 61850. Based on these insights in 2013 a new protection and control architecture was designed to be prototyped.
Design of novel SAS
The novel SAS-design replaces the need of special purpose IEDs with a flexible architecture monitored and controlled by one central station controller (SC). Supported by distributed controllers at bay level both conventional protection functions and more sophisticated algorithms taking the whole station into account can be implemented. These controllers are merging units (MU) that provide the necessary process data to the SC through Ethernet communication of sampled values and GOOSE messages as foreseen in IEC 61850 [5] . All MUs are connected to the same real time field bus in bay level. Thus in the station level all measured process data and status information is bundled and computed by one SC that can be configured due to IEC 61850 applying station configuration language SCL. For redundancy issues this central controller is mirrored by a second SC that supervises the first one and will back him up in case of failure. In case of communication loss the MUs in bay level work as backup protection. Thus, in principle the substation's functionality still can be optioned to be more dispersed.
Conventional SAS-Architecture
The task of a typical SAS is to measure, meter and protect the distribution grid. Each substation has several feeders that must be monitored and controlled. The substation's functions are distributed between IEDs on the same or different levels of the substation functional hierarchy -station, bay or process level [6] . In bay level IEDs acquire the currents and voltages from process level through instrument transformers. The connection between process level and bay level can be done by hard-wiring or using a field bus. The described architecture poses severe challenges to the system integration concerning planning, assembly & deployment, commissioning & testing as well as maintenance. Especially the amount of IEDs in a substation causes great effort for the system integration. Thus, the technical issue that needs to be addressed is the typical IED's structure. Current IEDs are equipped with dedicated hardware which means that firmware and hardware depend on each other. Since they are typically based on digital signal processors and use customized hardware, their implemented protection and control functions are not portable. Therefore, their implementations can neither be used from predecessor devices nor migrated to other hardware platforms of a different IED type. By using customized software tools the IEDs' functionalities can be chosen, parameterized and logically linked to each other. IEDs of the state of technology have an operational lifetime of approximately 10 to 15 years. When one reaches its end of reliable operation and needs to be replaced, then the same IED type must be kept in reserve for this. Because when an outdated device must be replaced the new device must be configured. But usually a time saving import of the configuration file is only possible with the same device. Another point is that the development of a new IED takes around 5 years until market availability. The reasons are that first a convenient hardware-platform must be found. Then it must be designed and the protection and control functions must be implemented.
Finally even the configuration software for the new IED must be developed. Conclusively, the conventional IED is a special purpose device with a high development effort and low flexibility. Its most important drawbacks are listed in the following:  Redundancy issue: Each bay is linked to at least on IED and bays with more functionality or higher levels of redundancy require more than one device. Full redundancy demands an additional IED with identical functions at the same location.  Engineering issue: Top-down engineering is difficult to implement as a single configuration file must be split-up and transferred to several IEDs.  Configuration issue: Each IED must be individually configured and tested during commissioning. Time effort and the risk of false configuration are high.  Installation issue: Each IED must be electrically and mechanically integrated which causes costs for planning and space.  Communication issue: Protection functions can require inter-bay communication e.g. for bus bar protection or earth fault detection in compensated networks. Interoperability between IEDs must be secured.
The allocation of functions in traditional substations is inflexible as functions are tied to bay devices. Conclusively, functions, wiring and mechanical integration must be taken into consideration at the same time for substation design.
Novel SAS-Architecture
The IEC61850 facilitates the effective substation monitoring, local & remote control, protection, primary equipment condition monitoring, and resolves the interoperability of different IEDs. Thus it has solved the technical bottleneck of conventional SAS [7] . To solve the described technical challenges for system integration in substations, a new SASdesign has been developed based on IEC 61850 for communication and IEC 61131-3 for application development of protection and control functions. Thereby all feeders' MUs are connected to the same real time field bus. The design's overview is displayed in Figure 1 . 
IEC 61850-based Distance Protection Relay
Distance protection requires the measurement of current and voltage to detect a fault and continuously calculates from these two signals the impedance. If a short circuit happens, the voltage collapses and high current flows. Thus, the measured impedance decreases, and the fault can be detected. Using the impedance information the distance from the measurement point to the fault can be calculated [9] .
The designed distance protection relay commands both symmetrical and asymmetrical faults applying a residual compensation factor for earth faults. The pickup and reset is controlled by a polygonal under-impedance zone [10] . After a predetermined time delay the trip operation is passed on for further computation and to trigger the fault distance calculation.
The standard IEC 61850 defines the logical nodes (LN) for substation applications and offers modelling examples for protection and control schemes [11, 12] . Still, the LNs connections are not predefined but can be chosen according to valid restrictions. In Figure 2 the IEC 61850-5 compliant distance protection scheme is displayed. The LNs TCTR and TVTR represent the interface to current and voltage transformer in process level. For each phase one instance needs to be allocated on the physical device. Figure 2 only displays single instances. The LN PDIS the distance relay that operates when the circuit impedance decreases beyond the predefined threshold. The change of the impedance seen by the PDIS is caused by a short circuit such as an earth fault. The impedance characteristic is a closed line set in the complex impedance plane. Forward and backward zones are represented by dedicated characteristics. The fault locator RFLO is triggered by the operation of the LN PDIS and calculates the location of the fault in kilometre. Thereby the monitored line's parameters must be known. Since not all data model's parameters are necessary, the LN's implementation can be reduced as shown in The LN PSCH is used to combine the outputs from multiple protection nodes and thus build line protection schemes. In the 1 st design it only serves to forward the operational condition of the LN PDIS. The LN PTRC is used to combine and condition various signals intended for tripping into a single trip condition. The LN CSWI is used to control switchgear as described by XCBR and handles operations from related automatics. In the design it asks for releases from CILO for interlocking and RREC for autoreclosure. The LN CILO is used for interlocking functions -here at bay level. The LN RREC is a relay that controls the automatic reclosing and locking out. After any protection trip, the automatic reclosing tries 3 times to reclose the open breaker again with different time delays assuming a transient fault. The LN XCBR covers all kind of circuit breakers that are able to interrupt short circuits. The logical node IHMI is the operator interface at bay level (configuration, local control) and can be used as well for station level (workplace). Currently the LN model in Figure 2 is allocated in one physical device that works as a bay controller since the process couplers still have to be connected to the SC using IEC 61850-compliant communication such as sampled values.
Distance Protection Scheme
For the distance protection a polygonal operation characteristic with equidistant relapse area for pickup was implemented. The protection pickup takes place when the calculated impedance is located in an area that is approximately 3% larger than the actual release surface. In addition, a noise reduction of the excitation was implemented with time-delayed tripping characteristic. Figure 3 shows the applied distance protection scheme. Using the calculated impedance of each phase, it is checked if the impedance phasor lies within the pickup plane. Depending on the directional mode a decision for confirming a recognized pickup is taken. If the pickup is hold for longer than a predefined delay time and the impedance phasor lies within the operational plane, then the distance protection operates. Only then is the fault localization triggered and calculates the fault distance according to the line parameter settings. 
Fault Distance Calculation
For the fault distance calculation, 1 st the fault type must be identified by analysing the three single phases. According to the identified fault, a fault loop must be selected for further computation. Here, the under-impedance-based fault identification determines the phase selection and thus the corresponding fault loop. Table 2 displays the possible fault loops in a three phase system. It is possible to compute only 6 fault loops to cover all fault cases and calculate the fault. Table 2 : Fault types and loops for distance relaying [8] In the following, the basic principle for the distance calculation is described according to [13] . Beginning with the chosen fault type either a phase-to-phase loop or a phase-toground loop has to be computed. For a phase-to-phase fault equation (1) is valid.
Where U Ph-Ph is the voltage and I Ph-Ph is the current between the fault-affected phases. For a phase-to-ground fault equation (2) is valid, since the influence of the zero-sequence current has to be corrected.
Thereby equation (3) calculates the residual compensation factor for earth faults.
Thus, equation (4) is valid for the impedance computation.
Where U Ph-E is the line voltage, I Ph is the line current, Z L0 and Z L1 are the line's zero and positive sequence impedance and I E is the allocated current of symmetrical components' currents. Since the arc resistance during a fault effects the fault loop's resistance, it should be neglected and only the imaginary part is used for the distance calculation. Considering the line's parameters, the fault distance can be computed in kilometres according to equation (5) .
Evaluation of Distance Protection
Distance protection schemes in distribution systems are used for achieving selectivity and short times for disturbance clearance. In order to analyse the implemented distance protection a simulation in MATLAB-Simulink® has been carried out. For this, a grid model has been developed with one power transformer that supplies two feeders with more than 20 nodes for each one. In Figure 3 the simplified single line diagram of the grid model is shown. It represents a typical urban distribution grid. Table 3 . In each secondary substation a load is connected with a set power factor of 0.9. The distribution grid has a nominal phase-to-phase voltage of 10kV, and a nominal frequency of 50 Hz. The results show the fault distance estimation along the line for an earth fault. During the simulation the fault has been moved along the line with a step of 10 meters. Figure 5 displays the test results of the fault localization. The estimation follows the true fault distance with a fixed offset but doesn't achieve a sufficient accuracy. This can be explained by the dispersed loads among the feeders that are typical for distribution level and affects the currents flowing through measurement point and fault. Still, the results indicate that the fault location technique is robust and can be implemented with the available technology.
Line Parameters

Conclusion & Outlook
In this paper the design of a new SAS-architecture based on industrial automation technology, the development of an IEC 61850 compliant distance protection scheme and its test results have been presented. Since coding according to IEC 61131-3 is manufacturer-independent the functional implementations can be easily migrated to new industrial automation platforms. Thus, whenever a new generation of hardware technology evolves the established functionality does not need to be developed anew. Furthermore, equipping substations with a protection-architecture as proposed is less expensive since the SC bundles all protection and control functions and thereby replaces the IEDs in bay level. The approach guarantees manufacturer-independent and flexible IEC 61131-3 programming, the replacement of special purpose IEDs, easy interoperability, extensibility and configuration due to IEC 61850 and supports the whole process chain from process level to station level and even farther up to network control system. The designed distance protection relay commands both symmetrical and asymmetrical faults. The simulation results prove that the distance protection scheme and its fault localization algorithm can be applied for the PLC-based SC. Still, the localization results lack accuracy which proves that the conventional reactance based approach for fault localization is not suitable for the conditions in distribution level. In a next step, the fault localization must be modified to meet the technical conditions in distribution level, e.g. according to [14] . Furthermore the grid model should be extended to consider the impact of dispersed generation on the fault characteristics. As well, it should be considered that in distribution systems connected lines usually have different impedance properties as various cable types are used. Thus different short circuit angles for the different cable types exist, which makes the definition of a compensation factor for earth faults more difficult.
